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Medical Costs and Health Insurance
Premium Costs
H. Luke Shaefer, Colleen M. Grogan, and Harold A. Pollack
Objective. To assess the effects of transitions from private to public health insurance
by children on out-of-pocket medical expenditures and health insurance premium costs.
Data Sources. Data are drawn from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation. We construct a nationally representative, longitudinal sam-
ple of children, ages 0–18, and their families for the period 1998–2003, a period in which
states raised public health insurance eligibility rates for children.
Study Design. We exploit the Survey of Income and Program Participation’s longi-
tudinal design to identify children in our sample who transition from private to public
health insurance. We then use a bootstrapped instrumental variable approach to es-
timate the effects of these transitions on out-of-pocket expenditures and health insurance
premium costs.
Principal Findings. Children who transition from private to public coverage are
relatively low-income, are disproportionately likely to live in single-mother households,
and are more likely to be Black or of Hispanic origin. Child health status is highly
predictive of transitions. We estimate that these transitions provide a cash-equivalent
transfer of nearly U.S.$1,500 annually for families in the form of reduced out-of-pocket
and health insurance premium costs.
Conclusions. Transitions from private to public health coverage by children can bring
important social benefits to vulnerable families. This suggests that instead of being a net
societal cost, such transitions may provide an important social benefit.
Key Words. Medicaid, State Children’s Health Insurance Program, health insurance,
crowd-out, medical expenses, Survey of Income and Program Participation
Public health insurance coverage for children increased from 18 million in
1987 to 30 million in 2007, primarily as a result of eligibility expansions in
Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), and
major outreach and enrollment efforts by states to increase take-up among




eligible children. Many have touted SCHIP as a federal-state success in ex-
panding coverage to uninsured families (Grogan and Rigby 2009). Perhaps the
most prominent concern raised about SCHIP, especially during the 2007
reauthorization debate, has been crowd-out: the possibility that expanded
public health insurance displaces private coverage. Findings are mixed re-
garding the amount of crowd-out resulting from Medicaid and SCHIP ex-
pansions. Still, many policymakers express concerns about the extent of
crowd-out associated with expansions of public health insurance.
Despite numerous studies, little is known about crowd-out’s implications
for affected families. Hudson, Selden, and Banthin (2005) contend that debates
over crowd-out point estimates ‘‘distract policymakers from the larger and
more important challenge of weighing various program benefits against pro-
gram costs’’ (p. 233). Some studies mention possible redistributive effects of
crowd-out in the form of effective income transfers (Cutler and Gruber 1996a;
Holahan 1997; Davidson, Blewitt, and Thiede 2004; Ham and Shore-
Sheppard 2005; Hudson, Selden, and Banthin 2005). However, few scholars
have specifically studied these redistributive effects.
This paper uses longitudinal data from the Survey of Income and Pro-
gram Participation (SIPP) for the period 1998–2003 to identifying children
ages 0–18 who transition from private to public health coverage, which in-
cludes but is not limited to crowd-out. We focus on transitions from private to
public health coverage rather than crowd-out because of the many challenges
in accurately identifying and measuring crowd-out. We begin by descriptively
comparing children who transition from private to public coverage to those
who remain on private health insurance throughout a given year, and to the
broader population of all children. We then examine two key outcomes: an-
nual out-of-pocket medical expenditures and health insurance premium costs.
We utilize a bootstrapped instrumental variable, two-stage-least-squares anal-
ysis to estimate the effects of such transitions on out-of-pocket medical ex-
penditures and health insurance premium costs. We estimate the probability
of a private-to-public transition in the first stage, finding that child health status
and expanded Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility are key predictive factors.
In the second stage, the instrumented private-to-public transition variable
has a significant impact on out-of-pocket medical expenditures and family
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premiums. Families with children who transition realize lower out-of-pocket
medical expenditures and family premium costs, on average, compared with
children remaining on private insurance all year. We conclude by considering
policy implications.
BACKGROUND
In a 2002 study of 10 states, Sommers et al. (2007) find that 28 percent of
children recently enrolled in SCHIP had private coverage at some point dur-
ing the 6 months before enrollment. Shone et al. (2008) find that a similar
proportion of SCHIP enrollees in New York had private insurance within the
6 months before enrollment, but that only 7 percent of all enrollees reported
reasons that the authors consider crowd-out. A majority reported parental
job loss or job changes. Household composition changes may also lead to
such transitions.
Rather than attempting to precisely identify crowd-out, some studies
focus on switches from private to public health coverage (Shone et al. 2008).
We refer to these as private-to-public transitions. In the present paper, we define
private-to-public transitions as occurring when an individual begins a year
with private health coverage and reports public coverage at some subsequent
point in the year. These transitions encompass much of crowd-out, but they
are not limited to it.
Existing literature suggests several potential effects of private-to-public
transitions. Because public insurance has fewer cost-sharing requirements and
may offer more comprehensive coverage, one would expect a transition to
public coverage to result in lower out-of-pocket medical expenses. Consistent
with this, Kenney (2007) found that SCHIP enrollment was associated
with reduced financial difficulties associated with meeting children’s health
care needs.
Private-to-public transitions may further result in higher wages for low-
income families. Buchmueller et al. (2005) examined the effect of SCHIP
expansions on employer-sponsored health insurance offerings. While they
found no evidence that employers stopped offering health benefits, they did
find that employers induced workers who were eligible for public insurance to
decline private coverage. Buchmueller and colleagues observed that by drop-
ping coverage, workers may gain what they would have paid in premium
costs, effectively raising their wages. Consistent with this, Leininger, Levy, and
Schanzenbach (2010) use the Consumer Expenditure Survey and find that
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rising Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility is associated with increased consump-
tion by families, targeted toward transportation and savings for retirement.
This paper focuses on the effects of private-to-public transitions by
children on out-of-pocket medical expenditures and health insurance pre-
mium costs, during the period 1998–2003. This period saw expansions in
Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility that reached the highest up the income lad-
der. (We also run our analyses on the periods 1997–2000 and 1997–2002). We
hypothesize that child’s health status will play an important predictive role, as
private-to-public transitions should be most attractive to these families. We
also hypothesize that expanded Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility will be as-
sociated with transitions. Finally, we expect to see the equivalent of a cash
transfer in the form of reduced out-of-pocket expenditures and reduced pre-
mium payments made by families with children who transition from private-
to-public coverage.
DATA AND METHODS
We use the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), collected by
the U.S. Census Bureau, which offers a longitudinal representation of the
civilian noninstitutionalized population in the United States. The SIPP is
commonly used in studies on the effects of public health insurance coverage
among children (Ham and Shore-Sheppard 2005; Gruber and Simon 2008).
The survey selects a nationally representative sample by clustering addresses
within cities and counties based on population counts from the most recent
decennial census. Low-income households are oversampled. Interviews are
conducted every 4 months about each individual in the household for each
intervening month, gathering data on demographics, welfare, family income
and structure, labor force participation, and health insurance. In all analyses,
we use sample weights and adjust standard errors to account for the SIPP
stratified design using Stata’s svy routines.
SIPP data were continuously collected during periods of rapid eligibility
expansion for state Medicaid and SCHIP programs. Our main analyses focus
on the period 1998–2003. We construct a pooled sample from the 1996 and
2001 SIPP panels to create a nationally representative sample of children ages
0–18, their parents, and siblings between 19 and 21 who are students, what is
referred to as the Health Insurance Unit (Kuttner and Rutledge 2007).
Our primary data sources for state Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility levels
are annual reports by the National Governors Association and annual surveys
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conducted by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (Cohen Ross and
Cox 2005). We assign Medicaid and SCHIP eligibility to all children using
age, family income, state of residence, and observation year. Family income
takes the form of an income-to-needs ratio, for which we divide total family
income by the family poverty threshold assigned to that observation. Because
we seek to emulate the methods used in other studies, we do not take into
account immigration status or income disregards in assigning eligibility.
Simulated Eligibility as an Instrument
To address the endogeneity of family health coverage decisions, most recent
econometric studies of crowd-out use a simulated eligibility instrument (Cutler
and Gruber 1996b; LoSasso and Buchmueller 2004; Ham and Shore-
Sheppard 2005; Hudson, Selden, and Banthin 2005; Gruber and Simon 2008).
We apply this technique to our analyses of private-to-public health insurance
transitions, constructing a child-level simulated eligibility instrument using our
pooled SIPP sample.1 For this, we take a fixed random subsample of children
for each age, 0–18 from 2001 (n 5 400 per age). We apply each state’s eli-
gibility rules to this random subsample and calculate the proportion that
would be eligible for public insurance by age-state-year. This value is then
reassigned to our full SIPP sample using age-state-year. This procedure assigns
to each sample member an exogenous variable between 0 and 1 that increases
with the overall proportion of eligible children by age and year. As a robust-
ness check, we replicated the standard crowd-out estimates reported by
Gruber and Simon (2008) and our point estimates match closely with theirs.
As stated previously, a child is considered to have transitioned if she
reported only private insurance of any kind in the first month of the year, and
reported public coverage at some point later in the year. We use this change
within a person-year to match with the annualized medical expenditure data
offered by the SIPP. Conditional on at least one transition, we find that there
are an average of 1.6 child transitions per family in a given year in our sample.
Given the nature of the analysis sample, this number should not be interpreted
as the number of children in the family or the number of children with any
particular form of coverage.
For the medical expenditure outcome variables, we use the medical ex-
penses/utilization of health care topical modules that offer comparable variables
from waves 6, 9, and 12 of the 1996 panel and waves 3, 6, and 9 of the 2001
panel. These topical modules provide annualized data on out-of-pocket medical
experiences and health insurance premium costs. Appendix SA2 discusses our
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analysis of data quality. It appears that the SIPP offers conservative but com-
parable estimates of these costs. Out-of-pocket costs are individual child medical
expenses, which do not include insurance premium costs. These have been
recoded to account for reported reimbursements, and we recode negative out-
of-pocket expenses as zero. The 1996 panel only collected out-of-pocket medical
expenditure data for children 15 and older. Thus, we run analyses on children
15–18 for the entire period, and children 0–18 for the period 2001–2003.
For the family premium variable, we cluster by family (as operationalized
above) to generate the family’s total annual cost of health insurance premiums
during the person-year. If a child transitions from private to public coverage, it
may likely affect the health insurance premium for the entire family. Parents may
transition, or they may go uninsured. Trying to calculate premium costs for the
child only would likely impose a downward bias on the estimates. In Table 1 we
report descriptive means for out-of-pocket expenses and family premium costs,
adjusted to year-2000 dollars. As expected, children who transition from private
to public coverage have lower out-of-pocket costs and their families pay less in
health insurance premiums than those who remain on private insurance all year.
We restrict our analyses to observations with responses included in the
topical module. We further restrict to children who are in the relevant person-
year for at least two waves (although does not substantively affect our main
results). For our main study period of 1998–2003, this yields a sample of
n 5 107,970 observations of children ages 0–18. Appendix SA2 reports on a
series of demographic characteristics comparing this subsample to the larger
sample of all children appearing in the SIPP during this period. Estimates from
the two samples are nearly identical.
We explore the effects of private-to-public transitions on out-of-pocket
medical expenditures and family premium costs using a bootstrapped instru-
mental variable, two-stage least squares approach. This methodology is nec-
essary given the endogeneity of family coverage decisions, especially the
binary nature of an endogenous private-to-public transition. The sample for
these analyses is restricted to respondents who remain on private insurance
only all year, and respondents who transition from private to public coverage.
This allows for a useful comparison group of children who remain on private
insurance. (Not included in this model are children who begin the year on
public insurance or uninsured, and children who transition from private
coverage to uninsured. We ran alternative models that included children who
began the person-year on private insurance and became uninsured, and
results proved similar.) In the first stage, we estimate a probit specification in
which the dependent variable is the dummy——private-to-public health
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insurance transition during the person-year observation. We use the simulated
eligibility instrument as our first-stage instrument for the probability of a
transition. Our specification for the probit model is as follows:
P̂ ¼ Pr½Xi ;j ;tbþ IVEligi ;j ;tyþ dj þ et þ ei ;j ;t > 0 ð1Þ
Here IVElig represents our simulated eligibility instrument. Other indepen-
dent variables included in X are measures of the parent-reported child’s health
status, changes in family composition (an indicator for a reduction in the










Age 9.23 9.04+ 9.55
Female 0.488 0.502 0.489
White, non-Hispanic 0.626 0.530n+ 0.776
Black, non-Hispanic 0.154 0.238n+ 0.090
Hispanic origin 0.171 0.181+ 0.091
Poverty level 296 200n+ 405
Total children 2.37 2.41+ 2.23
Total full-time workers 1.13 0.939n+ 1.37
Head is single female 0.224 0.336n+ 0.116
Total college graduates 0.432 0.192n+ 0.672
Health status
Excellent health 0.552 0.485n+ 0.616
Very good 0.290 0.305n+ 0.276
Good 0.135 0.178n+ 0.096
Fair 0.019 0.027n+ 0.010
Poor 0.003 0.006n+ 0.002
Out-of-pocket costs, ages 15–18
year-2000 dollars
U.S.$160 U.S.$176 U.S.$191
Out-of-pocket costs, all ages (2001–2003)
year-2000 dollars
U.S.$153 122n+ U.S.$205
Family premium costs (year-2000 dollars) U.S.$905 U.S.$651n+ U.S.$1,334
Observations 107,970 3,523 55,679
Notes. Subsample consists of respondents included in medical expenses/utilization of health care
topical modules. Observations from unidentifiable states (Maine, Vermont, Wyoming, North
Dakota, and South Dakota) are dropped. Observations included if they appear in the person-year
for at least two waves. Estimates are weighted and standard errors are adjusted to account for the
SIPP stratified survey design. Chi-squared test used for categorical health status variable.
nStatistically significantly different from ‘‘all children’’ mean at .05 level or above.
+Statistically significantly different from ‘‘private insurance all year’’ at .05 level or above.
Source. Author’s calculations from a pooled sample of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels.
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number of parents in the family during the person-year), changes in the num-
ber of workers (an indicator for a reduction in the number of full-time workers
during the person-year), child age (in a series of dummy variables ranging
from 0–18), child sex, child race and ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, black non-
Hispanic, Hispanic, and other), dummy variables for the number of children
0–18 in the family (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 or more), family income (as percent of
poverty and its square), family labor force participation (total number of adults
working for a large firm, total number of full-time workers); education (vari-
ables for the total number of family members with a high school diploma and
nothing more, total number with some college and nothing more, and total
with a 4-year college degree or more), and other variables for family com-
position (family headed by a single female, family headed by a single male,
and an indicator for a family headed by a unemployed married man).
We also include the state-month unemployment rate, the state-month
number of families on TANF, and state and year fixed effects (see Appendix
SA2 for a discussion of sensitivity analyses). All static demographic and labor
force participation characteristics are taken in the final month of the person-
year, following the private-to-public transition. Family income and the eligi-
bility instrument are taken as the average for the child over the course of the
person-year. (We also ran models with family income from the last month of
the person-year, and results were consistent.)
We then use these probit results to construct a predicted probability of a
private-to-public health insurance transition, P̂ , for each observation in each
year. This approach addresses the binary nature of the endogenous private-
to-public transition variable. We then use this predicted probability as an
instrument in a second-stage equation, specified as follows:
MEi ;j ;t ¼ P̂i ;j ;tgþ Xi ;j ;tfþ dj þ et þ ei ;j ;t ð2Þ
Here ME represents medical expenditures for individual i in state j at time t.
P̂ is the instrument for a private-to-public transition, using the predicted
probability generated from equation (1). X in equation (2) includes the same
independent variables included in equation (1), with the exception of the
excluded simulated eligibility instrument.
RESULTS
Table 1 provides a descriptive profile of children who transition from private
to public coverage, compared with the overall sample means and children
Transitions from Private to Public Health Coverage among Children 847
who remained on private insurance all year. While more than three-fourths of
the private insurance all-year group was non-Hispanic white, only 53 percent
of the transition group was. Annual family income of the transition group was
markedly lower than the comparison groups, with a yearly income at 200
percent of the federal poverty line, compared with 405 percent for those with
private coverage all year. The families of children who transition were less
likely to include a college graduate or a full-time worker at the end of the
person-year. However, most children transitioning from private-to-public
coverage had at least one full-time worker in the family at the end of the
person-year, following the transition. A third of children who transition from
private-to-public coverage lived in families headed by a single woman, while
only 12 percent of the private insurance group did. Children in the private
insurance group all year were in better health overall. Sixty-two percent of
these children were reported by parents to be in excellent health, while less
than half of the transition group was. Over all, the average child who tran-
sitions from private-to-public health coverage has a relatively low income
(though still well above poverty), is disproportionately likely to live in a single-
mother household, is more likely to be black or Hispanic, and is less likely than
the comparison group to be in excellent health.
Table 2 presents on the results from our main instrumental variable
specification for the years 1998–2003. As presented in the first column of
Table 2 (in probit coefficients and average marginal effects), the first stage
probit model performs well. Our simulated eligibility variable is large and
highly significant (po.001). The F statistic for our simulated eligibility instru-
ment is 17.86, run unstratified. When run accounting for stratification (ad-
justing for the number of strata), the F statistic is 8.94, slightly below the
commonly used rule for a strong instrument of F  10 (Staiger and Stock
1997). As would be expected, the instrument is strongest for the earlier years
when changes in eligibility were more common. For our models reported in
Table 3 for year 1997–2000 and 1997–2002, the F statistic, adjusted for strat-
ification, is well above 10. Given the consistency in results across time periods,
we believe our simulated eligibility variable is an appropriate instrument.
In addition to providing a useful first-stage, our probit specification also
produces notable substantive results, reported in column 1 of Table 2. Chil-
dren whose families saw a reduction in the number of full-time workers over
the year were more likely to transition than those in families who did not. After
controlling for other factors, children in relatively poor health were markedly
more likely to transition during a person-year than children in excellent
health. This relationship strengthens almost linearly from excellent to poor
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health status. Children in poor health——while a small proportion of the overall
population——encounter large out-of-pocket expenditures, creating the max-
imum incentive to transition. Alternatively, these children may have frequent
contact with health care providers who can inform families of their eligibility
for public health insurance and assist in enrollment.
Table 2, columns 2 and 3, report on the parameter estimates for the
instrumented transition variables and health status variables from equation (2)
(full output available upon request). In these models, the independent variables
for medical expenses are continuous variables for the total annual amount of
these expenses. Our instrumented transition variable has a large and statistically
significant effect on both out-of-pocket expenditures and insurance premiums.
These models suggest that a private-to-public transition by children ages 0–18
reduced their family’s health insurance premium costs by U.S.$1,300 (in year-
2000 dollars) during the years 1998–2003. During the period for which we can
estimate out-of-pocket costs for children 0–18 (2001–2003), such transitions
further appear to have reduced child out-of-pocket medical expenses by
U.S.$166. Both point estimates are significant at the po.05 level or above. As
Table 3: Effects of Private-to-Public Transitions on Out-of-Pocket Medical
Expenditures and Health Insurance Premiums Costs, in Real Year-2000










1997–2002  94  1243nnn
(153) —— (157)
1998–2003  96  1303nnn
(122) —— (157)
2001–2003  293n  166n  1650nnn
(147) (83) (288)
Notes. Subsample consists of respondents included in medical expenses/utilization of health care
topical modules, who report only private insurance at the beginning of a person-year and either
transition to public insurance or remain on private insurance only all year. Observations from
unidentifiable states (Maine, Vermont, Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota) are dropped.
Observations included if they appear in the person-year for at least two waves. See text for a full list
of control variables. Estimates are weighted and standard errors are adjusted to account for the
SIPP stratified survey design.
npo0.05; nnnpo0.001.
Source. Authors’ calculations from a pooled sample of the1996 and 2001 panels of the SIPP.
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expected, health status is highly associated with increased medical expendi-
tures. Children in poor health had an average of U.S.$1,384 more in out-of-
pocket expenses and U.S.$538 more in family premium costs, compared with
children in excellent health, after controlling for the other factors in the model.
Given the likely nonnormality of our outcome variables, we computed
bootstrapped confidence intervals for our estimates, performing 200 bootstrap
replications. We adjust boostrapping to account for the SIPP stratified survey
design. Within each replication, we estimate equation (1) and an accompa-
nying P̂ . We then estimate equation (2). This procedure allows us to compute
robust confidence intervals for all variables. Table 3 shows the 95 percent
confidence intervals for our transition variable. For health insurance premi-
ums costs, the range is (U.S.$1,062;  1,515). For-out of-pocket costs, the
range is (U.S.$22,  307).
Table 3 runs our models for a number of time periods, reporting point
estimates for the instrumented private-to-public health coverage transition
variable (full results available upon request). The first row shows that, even
before the 2001 recession (during the period 1997–2000——also the period for
which our instrument is the strongest), our findings regarding the reduction in
family premiums associated with a private-to-public transition remain
robust. During this period, a private-to-public health insurance transition
was associated with a decline in family premium costs of U.S.$900. However,
for 1997–2000, our findings for the out-of-pocket expenses of 15–18 year olds
do not hold. Private-to-public transitions during the period 1997–2002 are
associated with a reduction in family premium costs of U.S.$1,243, almost
identical to the estimate for 1998–2003, and a statistically insignificant
U.S.$94 in out-of-pocket costs for children ages 15–18. The parameter es-
timate associated with out-of-pocket costs for children ages 15–18 for the
period 1998–2003 is negative, U.S.$96, but again statistically insignificant.
This may reflect the small sample size available for this analysis. During the
period 2001–2003, all three estimates are statistically significant. A private-to-
public health insurance transition is associated with a reduction of U.S.$1,650
in family premium costs and a reduction of U.S.$293 in out-of-pocket costs for
children ages 15–18.
DISCUSSION
This analysis has several limitations that must be considered in evaluating the
results and in conceiving future analyses that build on the current results. First,
852 HSR: Health Services Research 46:3 ( June 2011)
as shown in Appendix SA2, the SIPP offers lower estimates of medical ex-
penditures when compared with the more specialized Medical Expenditure
Panel Survey (MEPS). Fortunately, differences between the two datasets ap-
pear relatively stable over time. The SIPP remains an appropriate dataset for
the current analyses because it allows for good identification of income and
labor force participation, and because it has family premium payments for all
types of health coverage. Future research might replicate these results using
the MEPS.
Second, income eligibility thresholds are only one dimension of SCHIP
policy. Expanded income eligibility may also proxy for related policies, such
as expanded outreach or streamlined administrative processes conducive to
enrollment. As noted by Dubay and colleagues (2007), SCHIP expansion was
accompanied by a variety of measures designed to streamline Medicaid en-
rollment. We suspect that there are multiple avenues of SCHIP outreach and
enrollment. Income-eligible uninsured children who utilize medical services
may receive help to enroll by professionals associated with medical providers.
Parents of children who utilize medical services also face especially strong
incentives to navigate the process of SCHIP enrollment. See Appendix SA2
for a more detailed discussion of this.
Third, we would have liked to consider model variations with child fixed
effects. Unfortunately, the annualized form of the medical expenditures data
makes this impossible, because it does not allow enough observations within
individuals for such an analysis.
Fourth, an analysis such as ours may be sensitive to specification and
sample selection. Because of this, we estimated a variety of regression spec-
ifications to address the robustness of our findings. As discussed in Appendix
SA2, these regressions did not alter our main result.
Fifth, reduced out-of-pocket and premium expenditures provide only a
simple metric to capture a much more complex set of economic benefits and
costs that come from shifts in insurance coverage. For example, we do not
capture some important benefits, such as the impact on wages or reduced costs
to employers that stem from reduced private coverage.
Finally, the present analysis does not unpack the insurance status of
other household members, including both siblings and parents. For example,
parents may enroll their children onto SCHIP and keep employer-based de-
pendent coverage. Alternatively, parents may choose to go uninsured while
their children are enrolled on public coverage. Still other parents, once they
have enrolled children on public health insurance, may choose to shift their
own coverage from private to public sources. We believe that understanding
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the broader dynamics of family health insurance changes among families with
children who transition will require a complicated analysis that goes beyond
the scope of the current study. However, we hope to address these questions in
future work.
With due allowance for study limitations, our paper suggests several
insights for policy and practice. Between 1998 and 2003, public health insur-
ance was expanded to include higher income groups than in previous years.
Rates of private health insurance coverage for these moderate-income groups
were somewhat higher, leading to greater possibilities of private-to-public
transitions (Congressional Budget Office 2007).
Given the limitations in robustly identifying transitions that constitute
crowd-out in nationally representative datasets, we focus instead on the
broader population of children making the transition from private-to-public
health coverage. A key contribution of our study is to develop the first de-
scriptive, nationally representative understanding of who makes these tran-
sitions, and to estimate what the effects of such a transition might be for
affected families. Our statistical modeling suggests that children in families
who transition from private to public health coverage are a relatively vulner-
able group. They are more likely to be nonwhite, low income (although well-
above poverty), and are more likely to be in relatively poor health. It is worth
noting that the characteristics of children in transitioning families change
somewhat during our study period. For example, the mean family income of
this group rises gradually from about 190 percent of poverty in the late 1990s,
to above 210 percent of poverty in 2002 and 2003.
Our instrumental variable results suggest that private-to-public transi-
tions may provide large financial benefits to affected families through reduced
medical expenses. We estimate such a transition is associated with a reduction
in family premium costs of U.S.$1,300 for 1998–2003 of U.S.$1,300, and a
reduction in child out-of-pocket costs of U.S.$166 for the period 2001–2003.
To put our point estimates in perspective, we compared them to two
measures: (1) the difference in employer premiums for single versus family
coverage, using the MEPS (Insurance Component). For the period 1998–
2003, this figure, adjusted to year-2000 dollars, ranges from U.S.$1,055 in
1998 to U.S.$1,569 in 2003. (2) Medicaid payments per capita for children,
made available by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured for
the years 2000–2003. This ranged from an inflation-adjusted U.S.$1,227 in
2000 to U.S.$1,373 in 2003. These benchmarks are consistent with our point
estimates and with the likely causal pathways for changes in family coverage
sources discussed above.
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For a family of three with a U.S.$27,000 income in 2003, our esti-
mated reduction in medical costs is roughly comparable to the value of
the federal Earned Income Tax Credit. However, rather than targeting families
according to earned income, this transfer disproportionately targets families
with high medical expenditures relative to their income. For the marginally
affected transition family, SCHIP bears some analogy to Medicaid’s medically
needy eligibility program in reaching individuals with high medical expenses.
These findings have policy implications. During the SCHIP reauthori-
zation debate, policy makers pointed out that many lower-income children
who were already eligible were not enrolled in state SCHIP programs,
and many of these children remained uninsured (Congressional Budget
Office 2007). This caused some concern that states had been too quick to
expand coverage to higher-income families before uninsured children in
lower-income families were covered (The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid
and the Uninsured 2007). Several studies, however, highlight the financial
burdens faced by middle-income families bearing substantial medical
expenses associated with care for a child in poor health. For this small
but vulnerable population of families, SCHIP may provide important and
well-targeted social benefits (e.g., Shattuck and Parish 2008). Our findings
suggest that transitions from private-to-public health insurance result in a
substantial cash transfer, and such a transfer may serve important social goals,
especially when the transfers reach low- and middle-income families with
sick children.
This analysis starts the process of assessing how well the health care
needs of children are being met in an increasingly mixed public–private
system. It further leads to many more questions worthy of further research.
To what extent are these private-to-public transitions temporary versus
long-term? To what extent do children make transitions in the other
direction, from public-to-private coverage, and what are the characteristics
of this group?
Perhaps most important, further research should look at outcomes re-
lated to the actual experience of care. Do children who transition from private-
to-public coverage experience any noticeable effects on service utilization,
such as changes in the prevalence of primary care visits or dental care visits?
What about changes in the nonmedical consumption of transitioning families
(Leininger et al. 2010)? These questions are not only important for under-
standing the situation of children but will also likely inform changing policy for
the broader nonelderly population, for which the health care system of the
future holds much greater integration of public and private coverage.
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1. Gruber and Simon (2008) use both a child and a family simulated eligibility
instrument. We focus on the child eligibility instrument, which is more
readily interpreted in our analysis.
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